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Abstract – In this article we start from the well-known contribution of the Austrian school 
with respect to the problem of knowledge  and its role in inter-individual coordination. 
Focusing on two authors of this school - his founding father Carl Menger and Friedrich von 
Wieser, we show that they both appreciate the role of knowledge  in the emergence of 
economic and social institutions. However, their divergences regarding methodological 
individualism and subjectivism lead them to provide two different perspectives concerning the 
emergence and dynamics of institutions. This is exemplified by Menger and Wieser’s way of 
dealing with the emergence of money: on one hand, Menger takes for granted the involuntary 
formation of shared knowledge about the validity of social institutions such as money; on the 
other hand, Wieser favours an explanation whereby collective beliefs are more than shared 
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The revival of interest in the issue of knowledge in recent years
1 has rarely given way to 
systematic studies of the nature of knowledge within mainstream economics. Within this 
tradition, an entire generation of economists, following the seminal work of Arrow (1955, 
1962), has confined scientific and technical knowledge to information, and argued that the 
knowledge generated by research activities possessed certain generic properties of public 
goods that implied that such activities could not be produced or distributed through the 
workings of competitive markets. By contrast, within the Austrian tradition
2, but also in 
Polanyi (1967) and in the case of evolutionary economics, we find explicit recognition of the 
influential aspect of knowledge in human action.  
The contribution of the Austrian tradition to this topic, culminating in the works of Hayek, 
is indeed undisputable
3. Several reasons may explain this special focus on knowledge.  
First and most importantly, it should be reminded that the Austrian economic tradition 
assumes that  human action takes place  in time and in a context of uncertainty
4. Such an 
assertion implies, first, that in contrast to neo-classical economics, data such as individual 
preferences or production techniques are not given, but gradually take shape through 
individual action, experience and learning as well as under the influence of institutions and 
collective norms or beliefs.   
Second, from a methodological perspective, the Austrian tradition is associated with the 
subjectivist viewpoint that it develops. This implies that, though often on a rather diverging 
basis according to the author considered, a fundamental heterogeneity in individuals is 
assumed. 
                                                 
1  This renewed interest has  already swept many fields in economics such as decision theory, game theory, 
finance and organizational theory as well as neighbouring disciplines such as sociology, psychology or social 
philosophy. This increasing interest for analysing the role of knowledge and beliefs in economic phenomena is 
also characterized by increasing confusion regarding the use of the concepts of knowledge and beliefs in the 
various fields of social sciences. It is clear that a more systematic and general reflection on the role of knowledge 
and beliefs still needs to be carried out but this is beyond the scope of this paper (see Arena and Festré 2006). 
 
2 Apart from the most famous Austrian authors, one should mention, in particular, Fritz Machlup, who is less 
known as an Austrian economist but also contributed to this field of research. His contribution is summarized in 
the 3 of the 10 projected volume series: Knowledge: its creation, distribution and economic significance 
published respectively in 1980, 1982 and 1984. 
 
3 For a study of the place of knowledge and economic beliefs in the second generation of the Austrian School see 
Arena and Festré 2006a. 
 
4 Cf. the opposition between real time and Newtonian time made by O’ Driscoll and Rizzo (1984). 
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From these two general  arguments it follows that knowledge  and beliefs  play a 
fundamental role in connecting agents’ decisions through time. Several questions then arise: 
how do individuals acquire knowledge? What is the nature of knowledge? How knowledge is 
created and diffused within the society? And finally how coordination arises? 
The answers to those questions vary substantially among Austrian authors.  To give only 
two polar cases, Mises, who endorses an apriorist approach, considers that knowledge consists 
of a priori logical categories such as causality and that human action is always intentional, 
rational and conscious, although he views history and law as playing some role in the 
determination of individual action (Mises [1949] 1996): p. 11). By contrast, for Hayek who 
favors a connectionist approach based on his 1952 book  Sensory Order
5, knowledge is 
conceived as a n abstract process undergoing change in relation to new individual 
experiences
6.  
This oversimplified comparison gives a hint of the variety of the conceptions of the nature 
of  knowledge within the Austrian tradition. It follows that conceptions regarding the role 
played by knowledge in economic and social activity will also vary by author.  
For Hayek, since  the process of classification into mental categories that underlies 
knowledge acquisition by individual agents is both abstract (in the sense of meta-conscient) 
and idiosyncratic,  it is obvious that  coordination of individual actions as well as 
communication between agents constitute crucial problems. As far as Mises’ analysis is 
concerned, communication issues are less central although coordination of individual actions 
remains an important question since it involves time as well as uncertainty. 
The importance attached to the problem of coordination of individual actions has also led 
the Austrian tradition to wonder about the role of institutions in economic and social life. The 
first who addressed this issue is the founding father of the Austrian School, Carl Menger. In 
his Principles (1871), he devoted an entire chapter to the question of the emergence of money 
to illustrate the distinction between organic and pragmatic institutions as regards their mode 
of emergence. For Menger, indeed, the case of the emergence of money is a striking example 
of how organic institutions – i.e., institutions that are not the result of individual’s will, nor 
the fulfillment of a collective objective, in contrast with pragmatic institutions that are the 
result of an individual or group of individuals pursuing an intentional goal– emerge. This idea 
remained a key proposition of most Austrians economists - as the well-known statement by 
                                                 
5 In support of this interpretation, see, for instance Birner (1999) and Garrouste (1999). 
 
6 Hayek defines knowledge as a “system of rules of action supported and modified by rules indicating 
similarities and differences between combinations of stimuli” (Hayek 1978, p. 41).   4 
Hayek ‘human action but not human design’ reminds us - even if, both the methodological 
background and the conception of knowledge of the author considered again reflect on the 
way he views institutions and their role in economic and social activity.  
 In this paper, we will focus on two authors: the founding father of the Austrian School, 
Carl Menger, and one of his direct successors, Friedrich von Wieser, who are emblematic of 
the way Austrian deals with the problems of knowledge and coordination. More particularly, 
we will contrast their respective conceptions of knowledge (and beliefs) in relation to the role 
of institutions. We will stress that, starting from a rather similar methodological background 
and being interested in solving questions such as how institutions emerge in an environment 
characterized by individuals’ heterogeneity, time and spatial constraints, they however 
provide divergent perspectives of institutional dynamics. 
Before entering into the details of their respective contributions to this field of analysis, let 
us make some general comments. 
First,  Menger and Wieser share the view that economic institutions are the product of 
individual action and not necessarily of human design. In other terms, they are interested in 
the self-regulating  or spontaneous order  properties of economic institutions or collective 
entities  while, at the same time, they cannot conceive them as not resulting from the 
interactions between individual agents, in compliance with the principle of methodological 
individualism. The process of emergence of institutions must therefore be explained from the 
perspective of heterogenous individual agents. It follows that assumptions concerning the 
nature of individual (or inter-individual) knowledge, the way it is transmitted from one 
individual to the other, and how it evolves through time, are determining to a large extent the 
role and the properties of institutions. In the following, we endeavour to contrast Menger and 
Wieser’s respective conceptions of institutions from this angle.  
  Second, they both refer, even if implicitly, to two kinds of knowledge (or belief), namely, 
individual knowledge (or belief), on the one hand, and collective knowledge (or beliefs) on 
the other hand.  As we will show, the articulation between these two kinds of knowledge 
appears to be essential in order to analyse such phenomena as the emergence or the 
maintenance of institutions as well as institutional change.  
However, Menger and Wieser do not perceive institutions the same way, the former being 
more focused on the problem of emergence of institutions, the latter being more interested in 
the problem of institutional change in relation to the forces of power.   
   5 
 
1.  Menger: t he role of knowledge in  the emergence of 
institutions 
 
For Menger, knowledge is central to economic phenomena in a very general and broad 
way. First,  individual knowledge provides  the foundations of a subjectivist conception  of 
value. As reminded by Hayek in his introduction to the English edition of Menger’s 
Grundsätze (translated into English as Principles of Economics), Menger defines value as “the 
importance which concrete goods, or quantities of goods receive for us from the fact that we 
are conscious of being dependent on our disposal over them for the satisfaction of our wants” 
(Menger quoted by Hayek, Introduction to Principles of Economics 1976, p. 18). On the basis 
of  this definition, it appears that value can hardly be conceived as a static and objective 
concept, reducible to the concept of  marginal utility, as sometimes alleged. Unlike classical 
and neo-classical economists, Menger is  indeed  not concerned about static resource 
allocation, but rather about resource use as a result of a better knowledge of production 
processes. Moreover, perceptions by individuals of their economic needs, conceived as the 
knowledge of the relationships between means and objectives is essential in the definition of 
economic value. 
In another passage of his Principles, Menger explicitly endorses this vision by writing that 
“the quantities of consumption goods at human disposal are limited only by the extent of 
human knowledge of the causal connections between things, and by the extent of human, 
control over these things”  (Menger [1871] 1979, p. 74). In this quotation, knowledge is 
conceived as general knowledge that is likely to expand with economic development. Menger 
indeed considers that any satisfaction of human needs begins from acquiring knowledge. For 
him, the driving force of economic life lies in gaining knowledge about relevant situations on 
a twofold basis. On the one hand, agents must know what their economic objectives are, i.e., 
their economic needs and how those ends can be achieved through time given the time- 
consuming nature of economic processes: “clarity about the objective of their endeavour is an 
essential factor in the success of every activity of men” and moreover, “it is also certain that 
knowledge of requirements for goods in future periods is the first prerequisite for the planning 
of all human activity directed to the satisfaction of need”. On the other hand, given any 
definite objective, people must know what are the means available to them in order to achieve  
their objectives:   “the second factor that determines the success of human activity is the   6 
knowledge gained by men of the means available to them for the attainment of the desired 
ends” (Menger [1871] 1979, p. 74).  
Those two directions of knowledge growth permit to define the usefulness of things, i.e., 
individuals’ knowledge of the causal relationship between means and ends. This kind of 
knowledge can be illustrated by Menger’s reference, borrowed from Aristotle, to “imaginary 
goods” as a counterexample. Menger indeed defines those imaginary goods as things  “that 
are incapable of being placed in any kind of causal connection with the satisfaction of human 
needs [but] are nevertheless treated by men as goods” (Menger [1871] 1979, p. 53). For 
Menger, t his situation  arises “when attributes, and therefore capacities, are erroneously 
ascribed to things that do not really possess them” or “when non-existent human needs are 
mistakenly assumed to exist” (ibid). The first case may be exemplified by cosmetics, love 
potions or medicines that were administered to the sick peoples of early civilizations, while 
examples of the second case may be medicines for diseases that do not actually exist, or 
statues, buildings etc. used by pagan people for the worship of idols (ibid). In sum, people 
may, owing to their ignorance or misperception of either their means or their ends, unduly 
consider some things as being useful, even though they are not. With the passing of time and 
thanks to economic progress, people are assumed to learn and have a better knowledge of 
their means and needs as well as of the relationships between means and ends in terms of 
usefulness. As mentioned by Menger in a footnote, the distinction between imaginary goods 
and (useful) goods can be connected to individuals’ rationality, as Aristotle suggests it when 
he distinguishes between true and imaginary goods according to whether the needs arise from 
rational deliberation  (in the case of true goods) or are irrational (in the case of imaginary 
goods) (ibid. fn. p. 53). However, Menger does not elaborate on this line of argument even if 
he seems that he endorses such a distinction. One may however consider that this distinction 
is unfortunate since it is possible to conceive rationality in a more general perspective, as for 
instance in the line of Raymond Boudon, and therefore, to consider that individuals have 
‘goods reasons’, even from the viewpoint of the  criterion of usefulness, to connect some 
means with ends in cases that would be considered as falling into the category of imaginary 
goods for Menger. 
 A second question arises  about individuals’ rationality: to which extent people can 
connect means and ends given the time constraints and the  uncertainty that characterises 
economic activity? Clearly, for Menger, the correct foresight of the quantities available for the 
satisfaction of intended needs is unrealistic, so that “in practical life (…) men customary do 
not even attempt to obtain results as fully exact as is possible in the existing state of the arts of   7 
measuring and taking inventory, but are satisfied with just the degree of exactness that is 
necessary for practical purposes” (ibid. p. 90).  
More generally, knowledge of causalities between  means and ends is a principle that 
guides economic activity as a whole and therefore, must not be understood as restricted to 
exchange analysis. First, Menger’s theoretical framework is based on the idea of the temporal 
antecedence of the production activity over that of exchange. Second, as well-known, he 
provided a microanalysis of the production structure defined as a temporal process 
characterized by vertical relations between different goods. The vertical hierarchy of goods 
or, in Menger’s terms, the order of the respective goods involved in the productive process is 
defined according to the degree of closeness of the good to the final stage of consumption. In 
terms of causal relations, this means that the basic direct causality between means and ends of 
one  consumer  does not differ in nature from the causality between productive goods of 
different orders within the production structure of one producer, but only in degree: the more 
remote in the production structure the good is the more indirect the causality is. Moreover, the 
value of remote goods is derived from the value of the final consumer goods they contribute 
to produce.  
As Menger notes, this perspective challenges Adam Smith’s conception of economic 
progress based on the principle of increasing division of labor. For Menger, it is clear that the 
increase in the  volume of  consumption goods going with economic progress is not the 
exclusive effect of the division of labor but should also be imputed to an increased variety of 
kinds of economic goods, and as a corollary, to an increased knowledge of the causal 
relationships between means and ends, which requires an increased knowledge of the already 
mentioned dual-purpose knowledge (knowledge of the ends / knowledge of the means) but 
now extended due to time constraints: the knowledge of the “quantity of goods they will need 
to satisfy their needs during the time period over which their plans extend” and the knowledge 
of “the quantities of goods at their disposal for the purpose of meeting those requirements” 
(ibid p. 80) 
This is o nly in this sense  that  it is possible to understand Menger’s sentence  “the 
quantities of consumption goods at human disposal are limited only by the extent of human 
knowledge of the causal connections between things (…)” (Menger [1871] 1979, p. 74). 
But as already noticed, this knowledge cannot, by nature, be complete: “error is 
inseparable from knowledge” (ibid, p. 148). With the extension of the production structure 
and the strengthening of time constraints, perfect foresight is an even less realistic 
assumption. Indeed, Menger saw the roots of uncertainty in the time-consuming nature of   8 
economic processes. Assuming that all production takes time, producers have no way of 
knowing for certain that the market conditions prevailing when the production is ready for 
delivery. The result is that price of the finished product bears no resemblance to the costs of 
production, since the two represent market conditions at very different points on time. To a 
certain extent, one could say that the principle of increasing knowledge goes hand in hand 
with a principle of increasing uncertainty. Moreover, the increasing number of kinds of goods 
raises the problem of factor complementarity and substitutability. 
Let us now envisage how Menger deals with these two issues.  
 
As economic development proceeds, some individuals specialized in the acquisition of 
knowledge emerge. It is the case,  for instance, of merchants, industrialists, who act as 
middlemen between “members of the society with whom they maintain trading connections” 
(ibid). With the passing of time, such middlemen constitute a class in its own right: they are 
“a special class of economizing individuals who take care of the intellectual and mechanical 
parts of exchange operations for society and who are reimbursed for this with a part of the 
gains for trade” (ibid. p. 239). These middlemen are referred to by Menger when he discusses 
the passage from the “isolated household” to the “organized economy” involving a transitory 
state of organization corresponding to the system of production on order (Menger [1871] 
1976, see Arena and Gloria-Palermo 2001, p. 137-38). From this perspective, economic 
development can be seen as a process of division of knowledge – a principle that will be later 
systematized by Hayek, though from a different methodological perspective. This naturally 
leads Menger to elaborate further upon the role of organization and institutions with respect to 
the problem of knowledge. However, he is not very wordy concerning the conditions in terms 
of knowledge (explicit or tacit knowledge
7, heterogeneity in agents’ cognitive capabilities) for 
those organization to emerge, to be maintained or to be efficient.  
 
There is in  Menger’s writing  evidence that those  middlemen, who arise with the 
development of the market, are more aware of the deficiencies of the previous organization of 
markets or have a better knowledge of their personal interest, which leads to improve the 
                                                 
7 Menger’s conception of knowledge is indeed difficult to specify precisely because it represents a very far-
reaching form of knowledge. It includes general and explicit knowledge like scientific knowledge but also some 
more local forms of knowledge, that might be assimilated to the “knowledge of the circumstances of time and 
space”, to use Hayek’s terminology.   Concerning this more local forms of knowledge, one can distinguish 
between explicit kinds of local knowledge that are  articulable on one hand, and tacit, unconscious and non 
articulable local knowledge (see see Fleetwood 1997, pp. 164-166).  
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efficiency of exchanges. But this does not imply that those intermediaries do possess a 
distinctive kind of knowledge, such as practical knowledge that would be associated to their 
intermediation activity. More convincingly, what Menger puts forward is that they display a 
different kind of rationality, in the sense that they act as innovators or as leaders (see Arena 
and Gloria-Palermo 2001, p. 138).  This assumption of a fragmented population made of 
leaders and followers is also implicit in Menger’s description of the emergence of money as 
we shall show. 
  
Concerning the problem of factor complementarity and substitutability, Menger 
emphasizes the principle of complementarity between goods of different orders, w hich he 
states as follows: “We can bring quantities of goods of higher order to the production of given 
quantities of goods of lower order, and thus finally to the meetings of our requirements, only 
if we are in the position of having the complementary quantities of other goods of higher 
order simultaneously at our disposal” (ibid, p. 85, italics in the original). Although this 
passage stresses the intertemporal complementarity constraint, it however does not prevent 
factor substitutability to occur provided this constraint is met.  
This suggests that the specialization / adaptability dilemma, borrowed from Richardson 
(1990)
8, does not necessarily apply to Menger’s analysis. As Lachmann puts it, the argument 
rests on the idea that factor complementarity and substituability do not represent two mutually 
exclusive alternatives, but “are phenomena belonging to different provinces of the realm of 
action” (Lachmann 1977, p. 200). While the notion of factor complementarity applies to 
capital goods utilized in the p rospect of a joint output, the idea of substitutability “is a 
phenomenon of change, the need for which arises whenever something has gone wrong with a 
prior plan” (ibid). Nevertheless, this argument does not preclude the lack of precision of 
Menger regarding organisational implications of both time constraints and uncertainty
9.  
This weakness also reflects on the problem of knowledge. As stressed before, Menger’s 
explanation of successive stages of productive organization in  terms of time and space 
constraints stands at a very general and abstract level of analysis. In retrospect, on can 
consider that Menger paved the way for a vast research field of research on capital theory, 
                                                 
8 This dilemma can be expressed as follows: if a firm always seeks specialization, this can be made only at the 
expense of adaptability in face of unexpected changes on the demand side. On this point, cf. Dulbecco and 
Garrouste (1999). 
 
9 In passing, this is an issue that Hicks will address seriously and that gives his contribution a strong Austrian 
complexion.  
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industrial organization and the role of knowledge in economic activity. Nevertheless, within 
the Austrian tradition, the road that will be followed focuses more on the prominent role of 
entrepreneurship than on the firm seen as an  economic and social device  for managing 
productive constraints. Kirzner’s contribution, judging from his insistence on the awareness of 
the entrepreneur, provides a striking example of this tendency. 
 
From a different perspective, Menger’s emphasis on time constraints and limits to human 
knowledge also brings up the issue of learning and its place in economic  life. Menger’s 
analysis of the emergence of money provides a good illustration of the importance of learning 
in economic phenomena and, in particular, in the emergence of the specific institution of 
money.  The case of the emergence of money is also typical of how Menger viewed the 




“How can it be that institutions which serve the common welfare and are extremely 
significant for its development come into being without a common will directed toward 
establishing them?” (Menger [1883] 1963: 146) 
 
In his discussion of the origins of money (Menger 1892 ; Menger [1871] 1979, chapters 7 
and 8, Menger [1883] 1963, Book 3, chapter 2), Menger points out that individuals do not 
always get what they want using the barter system. It is both costly and time-consuming to 
find the exact match, known as the ‘double-coincidence problem’ between individual needs. 
They tend to abandon direct exchange and exchange their goods with more marketable ones. 
The causes of saleableness in commodities is related, according to Menger, to different 
circumstances: to the organization of supply and demand (number of buyers, intensity of their 
needs, importance of their purchasing power, available quantity of the commodity), to the 
inner characteristics of goods (divisibility for instance) and to the organization of the market 
(degree of development of exchanges, of speculation and of free trade). Furthermore the 
saleableness of commodities is also conditioned by spatial limits (degree of transportability, 
degree of development of the means of transport, commerce and communication between 
markets) as well as time limits (permanence of needs, durability and cost of preservation of 
commodities, periodicity of the market, the rate of interest, the development of speculation, 
                                                 
10 From a methodological viewpoint, the case of the emergence of money or more generally of organic 
institutions  comes under the case of the “exact orientation of economic research”, while pragmatic institutions  
refer to the  “empirical realist approach” (Menger [1883] 1963: 55-61)    11 
the weight of political restrictions to intertemporal transfers of the commodity) (Menger 
[1871] 1976, pp. 246-247). Agents thus progressively learn to select increasingly marketable 
goods and proceeds to indirect exchange, although it does not permit immediate satisfaction 
of their needs: 
 
“The economic interest of the economic individuals, therefore, with increased 
knowledge of their  individual interests, without agreement, without legislation 
compulsion,  even without any consideration of public interest, leads them to turn over 
there wares for more marketable ones, even if they do not need the latter for their 
immediate consumer needs” (Menger [1883] 1963: 154) 
 
  This positive feedback
11 process eventually singles out one commodity, a commodity that 
becomes money. This selection process however is not the result of purposefully thinking 
about the advantages of  commonly understood or used money.  Market p articipants 
successfully experience smoother ways of trading for the sake of personal goals and, thus, are 
prone to carry on. In this case, the use of money by market participants is a spontaneous 
outcome of the market process. In other words, they do not invent money, nor are they able to 
know beforehand the superior properties of money  in exchange, since it is an unintended 
result of their self-oriented activities. But it is also the use of prior or ex ante knowledge that 
helps people find better ways of carrying out transactions. As Menger explains in his 1892 
paper on money , “the willing acceptance of the medium of exchange presupposes already a 
knowledge of  these interests on the part of those economic subjects who are expected to 
accept in exchange for their wares a commodity which in and by itself is perhaps entirely 
useless to them” (Menger [1892], p. 261).  
 
As such, Menger’s explanation is not satisfactory and involves some kind of circular 
reasoning: the question arises as to where this prior knowledge comes from since it is at the 
same time the result of  a selection process.  Menger’s answer to this question  comes as 
follows: “this knowledge never arises in every part of a nation at the same time. It is only in 
the first instance a limited number of economic subjects who will recognize the advantage in 
such a procedure, an advantage which, in itself, is independent of the general recognition of a 
commodity as a medium of exchange (…)” (ibid p. 261).  
To sum up, the process of selection consists in four mechanisms.  
                                                 
11 in the sense that a more marketable good is more exchangeable and then becomes more marketable.   12 
First, it is based on an asymmetry of knowledge between two classes of agents: ‘leaders’ 
that are more able to see the advantages of indirect exchanges because they possess a better 
knowledge concerning the saleableness of  specific  commodities: they are referred to by 
Menger as “the most effective” and the “more intelligent bargainers” (Menger 1892, p. 254); 
and ‘followers’, who imitate them and who progressively become aware that through the use 
of these specific goods become, they can proceed “to [their] end much  more quickly, more 
economically and with a greatly probability of success” (Menger [1871] 1976, p.258). 
Second, it involves a process of learning by imitation: ‘followers’ indeed imitate leaders in 
their use of money. They want what their neighbours do possess because they observe that 
their neighbours perform better by using ‘money’ than they do themselves without it. As 
Menger explains, “ (…) it is admitted, that there is no better method of enlightening anyone 
about his economic interests than that he perceive the economic success of those who use the 
right means to secure their own” (Menger 1892, p. 247) The kind of imitation involved here is 
essentially of the informational type
12 since ‘follower’ imitates the ‘leaders’ because they are 
supposed to have a better knowledge of the properties of money in exchange and  perform 
better.  
 
Third, the selection process is depicted as a self-organizing procedure. As already 
emphasized, Menger only reluctantly admits the intrusion of external or legal compulsion in 
the process of emergence of money. In his 1892 article, he makes clear that “money has not 
been generated by law. In its origin it is a social, and not a state institution.” He only admits 
that “by state recognition and state regulation this social institution of money has been 
perfected and adjusted to the manifold and varying needs of evolving commerce (…)” 
(Menger 1892, p. 255). Clearly, in his analytical framework, legal or state compulsion is, at 
the most, of secondary importance since social and economic institutions such as money or 
the organization of markets are the unintended result of interacting agents.  
Fourth, the emergence of money may be depicted as a self-enforcing learning process. 
Menger indeed emphasizes the existence of what economist  today would call network 
externalities or network effects, i.e. the idea  that the more the commodity is used as an 
intermediary of exchange, the more it becomes an efficient medium of exchange. In this way, 
a good which was initially used as an intermediate of exchange is converted, through 
“customs and practice” into a “commodity that [comes] to be accepted, not merely, but by all 
                                                 
12 Referring to Orlean’s typology of imitation (informational , self-reference and normative imitation).   13 
economizing individuals in exchange for their own commodities” (Menger [1871] 1976, p. 
261).   
With respect to the problem of knowledge, Menger appreciates the role of non articulable, 
unconscious knowledge when the use of money becomes ever more widespread, though never 
using the term of tacit knowledge. Rather, he implicitly refers to some social or collective 
knowledge that is embodied in social organic institutions
13. In other words, under civilization, 
the individual benefits from more knowledge than he is aware of. This is at least one way to 
explain the fact that useful organic institutions cannot be conceived only as a result of 
deliberate actions
14. In other terms, actors frequently do better than they know merely because 
they know better than they are aware of knowing.  It is then likely that with the passing of 
time the use of money becomes so anchored within habits and customs of market participants 
that using it does not require any longer the knowledge of its inner qualities in exchange. At 
this moment, using money becomes completely collective tacit knowledge.  Although this 
argument anticipates Hayek’s analysis of the process of abstraction of rules, the following 
passage from Menger gives some support to this line of interpretation: 
 
“With economic progress, therefore, we can everywhere observe the phenomenon of a 
certain number of goods, especially those that are more easily saleable at a given time 
and place, becoming, under the powerful influence of custom, acceptable to everyone 





In sum, Menger’s conception of knowledge is very general and far-reaching. It includes the 
two kinds of categories of knowledge that are usually distinguished within the literature 
(explicit vs. tacit knowledge) but also involves the articulation between individual and 
collective knowledge. Although Menger does not elaborate fully on the mechanisms at works 
in the articulation between individual and collective knowledge,  the existence of shared 
knowledge is however essential for understanding the process of emergence of institutions. 
                                                 
13 One may refer here to some kind of knowledge creation following Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995). 
 
14 The process of emergence of money can also depicted as a “stochastically stable strategy” (Young, 1988; see 
Garrouste 2003 110-111). In other terms, the institution of money emerges partly as the result of chance, and 
partly as the consequence of the better knowing of some agents of the intrinsic properties of the commodity that 
is likely to be commonly accepted.   14 
Moreover, this shared knowledge cannot be built through mere conscious imitation of leaders 
by followers. It is indeed the superposition of a collective / tacit knowledge that may explain 
the  self-organizing and self-enforcing  dimensions of the process of diffusion of money. 
Finally, it explains why organic institutions are the unintended result of interacting individual 
agents.   
 
 
2. Wieser : the role of beliefs in the evolution of institutions 
 
 
Friedrich von Wieser is the least known author within the triumvirate of the founders of the 
Austrian School. On the one hand, he is often viewed as a faithful follower of Menger paling 
into insignificance beside Böhm-Bawerk. On the other hand, his inclination in favour of 
authoritarian political regimes did not contribute to make him v ery  well-liked. These 
circumstances certainly contributed to the underestimation of his work. However, as it has 
been said, Wieser’s contribution to capital and imputation theory had a great influence on the 
development of the intellectual achievements of the second generation of the Austrian School 
even if it is mostly still unappreciated in the literature
15 ( Streissler 1987; Endres 1991). 
Moreover, from a methodological viewpoint, he offers a very interesting mixture of economic 
analysis and economic sociology that shares some common features with  Schumpeter’s 
theoretical construction (see Streissler 1988, p. 195 and Arena and Gloria-Palermo 2001). 
  More peculiarly, Wieser developed a very interesting analysis of the role of knowledge 
and beliefs in economic and social phenomena in relation to the issues of the emergence and 
evolution of institutions. The reminder of the article will be focused on this aspect of Wieser’s 
contribution. The accomplished version of this analysis is to be found in  his late book Das 
Gesetz der Macht (translated as The Law of Power), which he published only a few month 
before his death, even if the overall scheme of thought of this last piece of writing is already 
sketched out in  one of his previous works:  Theorie der Gesellschaftlichen 
Wirtschaft.(translated as Social Economics). More precisely, in Social Economics, Wieser is 
concerned about the deficiencies of a theory of marginal utility independent of the distribution 
of wealth or economic and social inequalities for those factors, according to him, do affect 
                                                 
15As Stigler (1941) puts it, Wieser’s contribution on capital theory “occupies a position of indisputable 
importance in the history of economics” and he “presented one of the best theories of capital which had 
emerged” in his time (Stigler 1941, pp. 158, 177; quoted by Endres 1991, p. 68). 
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subjective individual valuations
16. In particular, in contrast to Menger, Wieser maintains that 
political compulsion and power do play a decisive role in the formation of individual 
preferences
17. In this same book, Wieser contrasts the Theory of the Simple Economy with 
Social  Economics, stating that in the latter, social stratification between classes exerts 
substantial effects on the economic activity, and in particular, on individual preferences 
valuations (see Arena 2003, p. 303). The existence of three classes implies that the group of 
‘mass-commodities’ has to be evaluated by the marginal utility of the poor, the set of 
‘intermediate goods’ by the preferences of the middle classes and the group of ‘luxury goods’, 
by the valuations of rich people (Wieser [1927] 1967, pp. 157-58). 
But it is in his last contribution, the Law of Power, that Wieser provides an overall analysis of 
society that emphasizes power – power play, the psychology of power – and the role of beliefs 
in the emergence and evolution of institutions. We will therefore concentrate on this piece of 
work of Wieser.  
 
First, let us focus on some important methodological features and terminology of Wieser’s 
overall theoretical approach that might be helpful for understanding his perspective on the 
problems of emergence and evolution of institutions.  
From a methodological  standpoint, it is important to note that Wieser departs from 
Menger’s strict methodological individualism  and promotes an  original  view  that mixes 
methodological individualism and holism
18. This perspective is, for Wieser, a necessary one if 
one wants to deal with social phenomena such as the emergence of institutions. He indeed is 
not satisfied with individualistic explanations that provide no other explanation “(…)than the 
one which suggests itself in the personal sphere for the relations between individuals (…).” In 
particular, such explanations afford no room for “ the element of constraint or command 
without which the  [S]tate could neither originate nor endure and which can be clearly 
                                                 
16 For Wieser, there is not one but two theories of distribution: the first one measures the efficiency of productive 
services; the second determines the allocation of wealth. This distinction is made by a French sociologist 
economist, Roche Agussol, in “Friedrich von Wieser”, Revue d’Economie Politique, 1930, nos 4 and 5, p. 53, 
quoted by F. Perroux in his Introduction to the French Translation of Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic 
Development, Paris: Dalloz, p. 31. 
 
17As indicated by Warren J. Samuels in his introduction to the 1983 English translation of Das Gesetz der Macht, 
even in Social Economics, power is seriously taken into account since it constitutes, together with the principle 
of utility, the “twin organizing principles” of Wieser’s theoretical economic framework. This feature had not 
been unnoticed by Oskar Morgenstern, who wrote in his obituary to Wieser that Social Economics had been the 
“greatest systematic treatise that has been written by an Austrian in which the principle of marginal utility is 
analyzed in all its ramifications” (Morgenstern 1927, p. 671, quoted by Samuels in the introduction of  the Law 
of Power, Wieser [1926] 1983, p. xv). 
18 This is a feature that he shares with Schumpeter. See Festré and Garrouste (2006) 
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established for money as well” (Wieser [1926] 1983, p. 146).” In this passage, Wieser 
implicitly refers to Menger’s explanation of the emergence of money, which he considers 
unsatisfactory for reasons that are not only related to the absence of legal or State compulsion 
but also on other grounds that will be explained in the following. Wieser is no more satisfied 
with the polar case of collectivist explanations, stating that “in a roundabout way, [they] lead 
back to the individualistic explanation[s] by taking the people and the masses as a magnified 
individual” (ibid, p. 146). For Wieser, there is no hope in those two kinds of monist 
explanations. He also criticizes “dualist explanations”, arguing that they also confront us with 
problems  and do not, therefore, constitute a satisfactory alternative. Wieser takes as an 
example of the dualist explanations the classical distinction between the subjective (use) and 
the objective  (exchange)  value of goods, supposedly able to r econcile respectively the 
“personal or individual influences” and “those influences which transcend the personal or 
individual”. But without a suitable way for connecting those two elements, this approach 
cannot be accepted either. For Wieser, the manner classical economics connect the two 
dimensions is misleading because the “so-called objective exchange value does not by any 
means apply objectively to everybody”. More precisely, on the demand size of the market of a 
particular good, the principle of the objective exchange value holds true “only for those who 
can pay the current price, i.e., for those for whom the acquisition of the good brings an 
increase in utility which at least offsets the decrease in utility brought about by the payment of 
the price”. Symmetrically, on the supply side, the principle holds good “only for those to 
whom the attainable price brings an in increase in utility sufficient to compensate for the 
sacrifice which giving up possession of the goods involves” (ibid, p. 147). Wieser therefore 
concludes that  “the objectively determined price gives only the proximate base and not the 
ultimate standard for valuation, for one and the same quantity if money means a quite 
different utility experience for the poor and for the rich person (…)” (ibid, p. 147, italics in the 
original). In other terms, it amounts to saying that the so-called objective exchange value is 
the subjective exchange value for market participants since those who participate in exchange 
are oriented towards the same objective base, i.e., the market price. But for those excluded 
from the market, the objective exchange value has no meaning since “its outcome is as 
subjectively determined as is the personal use value in each individual case” (ibid, p. 148). In 
fine, the contrast between objective exchange value and subjective use value is nothing more 
than a “contrast between a multitude of parallel subjective cases and the isolated case” (ibid, 
italics in the original). 
   17 
From a terminological viewpoint, Wieser  refers to “social  institutions” as distinguished 
from “historical formations” with respect to their mode of emergence. Social institutions are 
characterized by the fact that they “are created by governments or by other order powers for a 
deliberate purpose and following a deliberate plan” or “in the awareness of a task to be done”,  
while ‘historical formations’ “grow up without the possibility of one’s becoming aware of a 
specific creator” but rather as a “searching force” Wieser ([1926] 1983, p. 141-45).   
At first sight, Wieser’s distinction is reminiscent of Menger’s distinction between organic 
and pragmatic institutions. By analogy, historical formations could be conceived as organic 
institutions since they are the result of unintended action while social institutions should be 
considered as pragmatic ones since they are the result of “intentions, opinions, and available 
instrumentalities of human social unions or their ruler” (Menger [1883] 1963: 145). 
Nevertheless, this analogy does not hold any longer if one reminds that for Menger, the 
distinction between pragmatic and organic institutions follows directly from another 
distinction of a methodological nature: the distinction between two orientations of theoretical 
research, namely the “realistic-empirical” approach and the “exact science” one
19. Even 
though Menger admits that these two orientations can supplement each other, they 
nevertheless constitute two logically distinct perspectives. For Wieser, by contrast, 
explanation of social institutions and historical formations cannot be the subject of 
independent analyses. On the one hand, Wieser explains that social institutions are always 
embedded in “historical formations” (Wieser, [1926] 1983: 146) in the sense that an emerging 
social institutions must necessary fit or be consistent with the contemporary existing historical 
formation.  Wieser takes as examples the market institution and monetary institutions, 
indicating that, “the market system presupposes the market as created by the coincidence of 
supply and demand”, or monetary institutions and that “the special monetary arrangements of 
a country are based on the general characteristics of money, which has come about as a result 
of the tortuous paths of commerce (…)” (ibid. p. 143). Generalizing this argument, Wieser 
maintains that: 
 
“[with] all institutional arrangements it can be clearly seen how in their effect they 
always depend on being properly adjusted to the nature of historical formations which 
serve as their foundations” (Wieser [1926] 1983: 143) 
 
                                                 
19 In passing, it is interesting to note that Menger’s distinction between pragmatic and organic institutions is 
purely formal since he neither elaborates on, nor give examples of pragmatic institutions. 
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For Wieser indeed, a market system which is not consistent with the law of supply and 
demand cannot succeed. The same is true for “a monetary system attempting to maintain a 
value of money which has become untenable by an excess of monetary media issued by the 
state” (ibid. p. 143). 
 One the other hand, historical formations are defined  in relation to power, which  as 
already mentioned, plays an important role in Wieser’s analysis of institutions. This 
characteristic stands in sharp contrast with Menger’s framework, in which power (or even 
state power) is virtually absent
20. On the contrary, when referring to historical formations, 
Wieser notes that they constitute particular states of the evolution of the society, characterized 
by a certain social stratification of powers, and which result from “the  accord of many 
personal units of consciousness which to a certain degree give up their independence, but 
without a higher encompassing unit of consciousness taking their place” (Wieser [1926] 1983, 
146, italics in the original).  
Wieser’s analysis of power is based on two distinctions: on one hand, the distinction 
between masses and leaders; on the other hand, the distinction between internal and external 
power. 
If Wieser distinguishes between leaders and masses, it is more to put forward that their 
respective behaviours or rationality obey different laws or display a distinct psychology of 
power than to suggest an idea of intellectual superiority of leaders with respect to masses or to 
convey a pejorative meaning to the term ‘mass’. In Wieser’s own terms, being a leader “(…) 
means nothing but to be the first in matters of common concern [and] [t]he social function of 
a leader is to walk in front (…)” (Wieser [1926] 1983, p. 38). However, the phenomenon of 
leadership is based on the existence of inequalities within a given population: it is governed 
by the “law of small numbers” based “on the social success of small groups” (ibid. p.1). 
Moreover, it is possible to distinguish between two types of leadership according to the mode 
of their emergence. On the one hand, there is the authoritarian kind of leadership, including 
despotic as well as lordly leadership, who emerges from historical selection by success. On 
the other hand, there is the cooperative kind of leadership, including  leadership in a free 
                                                 
20 To be more exact, Menger emphasizes the role of power but only in the sense of the power of command over 
economic resources. In other terms, he deals with power as a necessary condition for being (or not) in position to 
use economic goods but does not elaborate further on how power is distributed among individuals and how this 
distribution evolves through time and on the interaction of agents or groups of agents.   19 
society as well as  anonymous leadership,  which  results from an election process by the 
masses.”(Wieser [1926] 1983, p. 39)
21.  
As far as masses are concerned, Wieser describes them as “following the leader” (ibid. 
p. 38),  although he distinguishes between  two  forms  of following:  dead masses or  blind 
following;  true following. Blind following  refers to  a passive form of following  that is 
reducible to sheep-like behaviour or to normative imitation
22: “the model of the anonymous 
leader is being emulated by his environment and subsequently by a wider circle as well” (ibid. 
p. 44). True following, on the contrary, refers to reflective searching type of following or 
active following “which demands of the masses a certain independence of conduct and the 
capacity to adapt to the given circumstances” (ibid. p. 45). Moreover, i n the case of true 
following, the psychology of masses also displays a process of internalization (or even true 
identification) of power: 
 
“Internal power arouses in the masses the urge for ready emulation. In this connection 
the individual obeys not only his own instinct, but his behavior is also determined by 
the contact he has with the attitude of his environment and that of the masses in their 
entirety. The experience of power is intensified by the fact that the individual 
submitting to power thereby enhances the effective weight of internal power in 
society: he joins the ranks of the social rulers, albeit with a minimal share of power” 
(Wieser [1926] 1983: 57)  
 
This passage suggests a dynamics between masses and leaders that is more complex than 
the term ‘following’ suggests. In fact, as we shall develop, this dynamics cannot be described 
in terms of imitation only. In particular, it involves the interplay of ‘internal power’, which 
constitutes a critical  factor of the dynamics between masses and leaders . Let us now consider 
how Wieser defines internal power as distinguished from external power.   
Wieser conceives “internal power” as being “impersonal and anonymous” (Wieser [1926] 
1983, p. 3) while “external power” corresponds to  the power that some persons or some 
groups exert on people with the help of “external” means such as “numerical superiority, arms 
or wealth” (ibid. p. 3). Internal power may be channelled by several means: science and 
knowledge for instance, through “historical education”, contribute to the creation of the social 
                                                 
21 Here again, one may be tempted to apply Menger’s typology of pragmatic vs. organic to leadership. The 
analogy is however quite superficial. What is arguable, however, is that Wieser is more focused on historical 
formations and cooperative leadership and that he privileges causal-genetic explanations, which places him 
squarely in Menger’s tradition from this viewpoint. 
 
22 If we stick to Orléan’s definition (op. cit.), normative imitation occurs in situations where people, for 
reputation motives, are inclined to imitate the behaviour of others, by fear of sanctions or social disapproval. In 
the case of authoritarian leadership, this type of behaviour is very common.     20 
interactions which support social internal power (ibid. p. 107), while arts rather falls in the 
category of external power and leaders, even if it is rooted in the populace (ibid. p. 113). But 
the power of knowledge, contrary to faith power, is not a direct power but needs many 
intermediaries within the ruling classes in order to reach masses. It is therefore associated 
with Wieser’s first law of social growth: the tendency toward increasing stratification (ibid. p. 
26). 
To a certain extent, the distinction between internal and external power again  echoes the 
one between historical formations and social institutions. Internal power indeed refers to 
historical formations conceived as the result of unintended actions while external power can 
be associated with social institutions viewed as human devices designed with a specific task 
or purpose in mind. Similarly as in the case of the distinction between historical formations 
and social institutions, internal and external power can hardly be dealt with independently 
from each other
23. As Wieser emphasizes, there must be some complementarity and 
consistency between internal and external power. Related to this issue, he criticizes Nietzsche 
and Spencer’s too emphatic conception of the leader or the “great man” which is, according to 
him, out of touch with the reality of masses (ibid. p. 46):  
 
“[i]ndispensable as is the performance of the leader in front for the achievements of 
society, no less so is the following by the masses. If the leader is viewed as the sower 
casting out the seed, the masses may be viewed as the ground which absorbs it” 
(Wiser [1926] 1983: 47) 
 
This quotation brings us back to the issue of methodological individualism and holism. As 
we have emphasized, Wieser is neither satisfied with monist approaches nor with dualist ones, 
as he understands them. So what is the suitable method to be applied? Wieser’s answer is not 
always clear and his argument easy to follow. As we have also stressed, when he describes the 
dynamics between masses and leaders, Wieser clearly has in mind something more than 
passive imitation or ‘blind borrowing’. We could argue that the kind of following that he 
labels ‘true following’ has some common features with self-reference imitation, defined by 
Orléan as a kind of imitation that takes place when agents imitate but, by so doing, create a 
social value or a convention that gather some momentum and gain some autonomy vis-à-vis 
individuals that initiated the dynamics. By the same token, the idea of “anonymous 
leadership” could also be interpreted as a sophisticated mechanism that involves more than 
                                                 
23 In contrast to Menger’s treatment of organic vs. pragmatic institutions, as we already pointed out above in this 
article.   21 
mutual interaction between masses and leaders. For, as Wieser indicates, this kind of 
leadership is characterized by the fact that “the social success of small groups can be 
magnified to full-fledged social success if the new strength, which first was formed by the 
small group in its own interest, is removed from its control and placed at the disposal of the 
society as a whole” (ibid. p. 33)
24.  
 
The following arguments may indeed support this view.  
First, Wieser refers to the notion of ‘objective spirit’ which he borrowed from Dilthey and 
Freyer, whose teaching was widespread in Germany. He argues that the existence of  an 
‘objective spirit’ plays an essential role in the articulation between individuals or masses and 
leaders and strengthens the coherence of social systems. More precisely, this ‘objective spirit’ 
relates to the commonly observed psychology of social human beings to infer from others and 
share some significations or values:  
 
“Because we ourselves are moved by emotions, follow impulses, act purpose-oriented, 
connect mental images, forge concepts, and because t his structural coherence of 
minds, characteristic of our very nature, falls within the realm of our experience, we 
can imagine ourselves as partaking in the consequences of the acts of foreign human 
beings and can re-create what spiritual values they contain (…) What is foreign 
becomes a signpost which we are able to follow even when it does not guide us simply 
in a certain direction but leads us to a plenitude of heterogeneous realities: languages, 
literatures, states, architectural styles, churches, customs, arts, and systems of 
sciences” (Freyer, Theory of the objective Spirit, quoted by Wieser [1926] 1983: 147) 
 
This idea of ‘objective spirit’ can be interpreted as a means to articulate individual beliefs 
or values with collective ones in a manner that is more sophisticated that the one implied by 
mere imitation. More precisely, for Wieser, the objective spirit of a community is more than a 
signpost: it is “like a current to which we are glad to yield because we feel its supporting 
power and whose superior strength we possibly may not be able to escape at all even when we 
are terrified to discover that it will carry us toward the abyss” (ibid, p. 148). In other terms, 
the ‘objective spirit’ becomes an entity which has its own developmental mechanisms, such as 
inertia, self-preservation (ibid. p. 124) and destructive power. However, its autonomy vis-à-
                                                 
24 In passing, this quotation could be put in perspective with the notion of heteronomy, borrowed from political 
philosophy, and defined as the subordination or subjection of individuals to the law of another or to something 
else that individuals fail to see. This notion is in sharp contrast with the a widespread idea among Austrian 
authors of the autonomy of the individual vis-à-vis the State. As rightly put forward by J-P Dupuy, this boils 
down to the theoretical problem of the articulation between two kinds of autonomy: 1) the autonomy of the 
individual freed from any relation of subordination towards the sacred, the State or the social whole; 2) the social 
autonomy, which does not mean that men do control the society, quite the opposite: the society escape them, it 
seems to be endowed with a life on its own, foreign to the individuals that form it (see J-P. Dupuy 1992, p. 247)   22 
vis individuals “must not undermine our recognition that it is borne out of the spirit of the 
united individuals” (ibid, p. 149).  
The idea of ‘objective spirit’ can also be related to Wieser’s notion of social egoism, which 
he already  developed in Social Economics. For Wieser, social egoism is conceived as an 
intrinsic component of the psychology of human beings implying that “by reason of the social 
egoism a m an is ready to fit into the social order which includes both submission and 
domination” (Wieser [1927] 1967, p. 161). 
 
Second, Wieser refers to the notion of success, a concept that he shares with Menger by the 
way. But, in contrast to Menger, for Wieser, the notion of success encompasses more than the 
idea of the replication by followers of supposedly efficient behaviours displayed by leaders. 
As pointed out by Samuels (op. cit.), Wieser’s concept of ‘success’ is not defined in abstracto 
as the achievement of the fittest economic state. In particular, depending on the fact that it is 
actual or perceived, success can also lead to negative outcomes, such as dictatorships:  
 
“Success constitutes a mechanism, as it were, of historical selection. The course of 
history is marked by a path of success vis-à-vis other paths which might have been. 
Success in this context signifies survival (…). Success, in Wieser’s analysis, has no 
independent positive or normative, ex ante, test. It is circumstantial, episodic, and 
without external or internal value basis independent of the fact of survival. It is the 
consequence of successes, however, which marks the course of history” (Samuels, 
introduction of the Law of Power, Wieser [1926] 1983, p. xxxi) 
 
Third, Wieser refers to “ the law of upward mobility of classes
25”, which implies the 
existence of  a tendency towards the congruence of beliefs  between  masses and leaders. 
Indeed, at first, masses have no share in public power, but through social interaction – through 
labor and art essentially, they may have an opportunity to further their personal achievements 
and therefore, to resist the pressure from the leaders and not completely succumbing to it. As 
far as the ruling leaders are concerned, they are themselves aware of their own  interest in 
augmenting the vigor of the people to utilize it better, so that the more enlightened rulers have 
a strong affinity for the populace and begin sharing public power with it. As Wieser 
summarizes it:  
 
“In the present epoch, the face of the earth is being technically transformed by the 
alertness of (…) both those in command and those in subordination positions. All 
                                                 
25 This law defines the second law of social growth, the first one, being, as already mentioned,  the “law of 
increasing social stratification”.   23 
these quietly evolving and ascending collective forces have in due time been 
transformed into social power or they will do so, acting  as a resistance first but 
eventually also sharing leadership roles” (Wieser [1926] 1983: 26) 
  
 
All these arguments give strong support to an interpretation of Wieser’s approach of the 
emergence of institutions in terms of a more sophisticated dynamics of social interaction than 
the one put forward by Menger. This interpretation is reinforced by thorough investigation of 
Wieser’s remarks regarding Menger’s explanation of the emergence of money.  In  Social 
Economics, Wieser dedicates several pages to Menger’s approach of the emergence of money. 
If he clearly regards, as Menger, money as one of the founding institutions of social economy, 
he has reservations about the way Menger deals with the issue of its emergence. On the one 
hand, he appreciates Menger’s novel “penetrating investigation” into the problem of money 
which – by taking “the phenomenon of money as a paradigm” allowing to show that “all 
social institutions of the economy are nothing more than ‘unintended social results of 
individual teleological factor’ (Untersuchungen, pp. 171-87)” – put an end to the “long series 
of writers who sought to explain money as an individualistic institutions.” (Wieser [1927] 
1967: 163). On the other hand, a few pages later, he point out that:   
 
“Menger’s explanation would be entirely satisfactory if he had appreciated as fully the 
part that the masses play in the development of money as he did that taken by leaders. 
The function of the masses consists in that their imitation establishes the universal 
practice which gives to a rule its binding force and social power. (…) It is in keeping 
with (…) [his] individualistic point of view that he (…) [did] not fully appreciate the 
part played by the masses in the creation of money. (…) Therefore it is not possible 
for him (…) to concede that money represents something more and stronger than the 
will of participating individuals. A money for which a mass habit of acceptance has 
once been established is no longer the mere result of the individual aims of leaders 
whom the masses follow. Neither in the beginning nor later did the leaders have in 
mind a social institution. (…) The final form of money is not a mere resultant; because 
of the universal social resonance that it awoke it represents a tremendous 
strengthening of their endeavors” (Wieser [1927] 1967: 165, underlined by us) 
 
 
From this passage, it follows that the intervention of masses cannot be interpreted as an act 
of pure recognition of the social utility of leaders’ decisions. For reasons that still need to be 
elaborated upon, m asses tend to create a final rule “far beyond [leaders]’ expectations” 
(Wieser [1927] 1967: 165). This suggests again an interpretation of Wieser’s approach   24 
conception of the emergence of institutions in terms of conventions (or social norms) or in 
terms of the supervenience approach, as we already sketched out. 
 
Such an interpretation is also consistent with Wieser’s description of some of the 
characteristics of the social dynamics between leaders and masses. As we have shown, for 
Wieser, this dynamics is not only governed by purely economic interests but also includes 
some extra-economic sociological laws such as the law of power, the law of increasing social 
stratification, the law of upward mobility of classes or the role of success. The resulting effect 
of these mechanisms is all but determinist,  even  neither can it be considered as welfare 
improving. From this viewpoint, Wieser differentiates himself from Menger who implicitly 
assumes that organic institutions serve the common welfare. Additional arguments taken from 
Wieser’s writings may be put forward in order to support this view.  
  First, Wieser makes reference to “inner rules” such as inertia effects or self-destruction 
mechanisms that underlie the law of power, as the following quotation exemplifies:     
 
“A social group, once it has been formed into a unit by the sacrificium voluntatis of its 
members, cannot easily be jolted by the sacrifices which it demands of them. Once 
success has induced leaders and masses to go together, failure will not automatically 
induce separation in spite of the losses caused by it” (Wieser [1926] 1983: 26) 
 
Those mechanisms belong to the psychology of power and constitute what Wieser refers as 
the ‘supra-social’ or ‘anti-individual’ or even ‘anti-social’ character of power, which stands 
“in complete reversal to the law of success” (Wieser [1926] 1983: 71). They also contribute to 
explain the emergence of collective wholes or social entities that have acquired some 
autonomy vis-à-vis individuals. This ‘holistic’ feature does not however lead to neglect the 
role of individuals within social dynamics. Wieser indeed explains that personal strength is at 
the origin of the growing of power but, “by aligning itself with the strength of a like-minded 
individuals, [it] is being enhanced way beyond its inherent potential[;] [a]longside it, there is a 
strengthening of the feeling of power, though at the same time strength in no small degree is 
being deprived of its personal roots” (ibid. p. 70).  
 
Moreover, by emphasizing the relation of individuals towards their neighbourhood but also 
towards the society considered as a whole entity, Wieser is able, in contrast to Menger, to deal 
with the issue of the evolution (and not only of the emergence) of institutions.  For instance, 
Wieser points out the possibility of conflicts between a new historical task and existing   25 
historical powers (ibid. p. 203), or the existence of tensions regarding the sharing of power 
between the leadership strata and the strata representing the  masses (ibid. p. 52).  In 
mathematical terms, leaving aside the well-know reservations of Austrian economics about 
the use of mathematical relationships, these conflicts or tensions could be assimilated to path-
dependency or hysteresis effects. 
 
To conclude, Wieser is far from being a faithful following of Menger. His overall scheme 
of thought displays original thinking on several issues. First, on the methodological ground, 
Wieser’s combination of individualism and holism and of economic analysis and economic 
sociology  is very insightful and demonstrates quite convincingly, by using the method of 
successive approximations, the limits of pure economics, in particular regarding power 
considerations. From this perspective, his contribution is comparable to the one of Pareto (see 
Ragni in this volume) or Schumpeter (concerning Schumpeter, see the introduction of Arena 
and Dangel-Hagnauer, 2002). Second, by facing the problem of the influence of individual 
and social knowledge as well as systems of beliefs on economic and social phenomena, he 
offers a broader conception of rationality, where beliefs and action cannot be dealt with 
separately but determine each other. This concern, which is to-day very lively among social 
philosophers and sociologists, makes Wieser’s contribution very topical.  Third, Wieser’s 
contribution is also very enlightening regarding institutional matters. In particular, it provides 
some foundations for an analysis of the dynamics of institutions based on interlocking groups 




  Menger and Wieser approaches to the problem of the emergence of institutions share some 
common features. On the one hand, they both see it as the “unintended social results of 
individual tendencies” (Menger [1927] 1967). On the other hand, both authors introduce a 
distinction between leaders and followers or masses, which  underlies a further distinction 
between innovative and imitative behaviours. However, for Wieser, those two kinds of 
behaviour may overlap, because they also are rooted and subject to the law of power.  This 
original feature of Wieser also permits to provide an analysis not only of the emergence but 
also on the evolution of institutions. Furthermore, they both appreciate the role of knowledge 
in  economic and social phenomena in general,  and in the more particular case of the   26 
emergence of institutions. As we have shown, both explanations of the emergence of 
institutions involve the interplay of individual and collective knowledge (or beliefs). If they 
both attempt to analyse the phenomenon of economic or social institutions from the 
perspective of interactions between individuals, they however differentiate from one another 
as regards the dynamic process underlying those interactions. On one hand, Menger takes for 
granted the involuntary formation of shared knowledge about the validity of social institutions 
such as money. On the other hand, Wieser favours an explanation whereby collective beliefs 
are more than shared knowledge since they do have some autonomy vis-à-vis individuals.  
A we have stressed, Wieser’s emphasis on the psychology of masses and leaders lead him to 
consider  the influence of compulsion forces, besides the forces of freedom or “natural 
controls”, on the historical formations underpinning institutions, while they are discarded by 
Menger. This also explains why Wieser views historical development and social institutions 
as radically non deterministic, and possibly  welfare damaging,  while Menger  implicitly 
assumes, judging from his analysis of the emergence of money, that they are always welfare 
enhancing. To this extent, Menger’s analysis is limited to the emergence of institutions, 
viewed as a ‘discovery’ process, while Wieser’s is more focused on the dynamics of 
institutions, seen as a creative-destructive process.  
 
   27 
Bibliography 
 
Arena R. 2003. ‘Economic agents and social beliefs in the Austrian trandition: the case of 
Friedrich von Wieser’,  Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali, 
50(3): 291-309. 
 
Arena R. and Dangel-Hagnauer C. 2002.  The Contribution of Joseph Schumpeter to 
Economics: Economic Development and Institutional Change. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Arena R. and Festré A. 2006. Knowledge and Beliefs in Economics. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
 
Arena R. and Festré A. 2006a. Knowledge and Beliefs in Economics: The Case of the 
Austrian Tradition. In R. Arena and A. Festré (eds), Knowledge and Beliefs in Economics. 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar (2006). 
 
Arena R. and Gloria-Palermo S.  2001.  ‘Evolutionary themes in the A ustrian tradition: 
Menger, Wieser and Schumpeter on institutions and rationality’. In P. Garrouste and S. 
Ioannides (eds), Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Ideas. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar (2001). 
 
Boudon R. 1981. The Logic of Social Action. London andBoston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Birner J. 1999. ‘The surprising place of cognitive psychology in the work of F.A. Hayek’, 
History of Economic Ideas 7(1-2): 43-84. 
 
Dulbecco P.  and Garrouste P. 1999. ‘Toward an Austrian theory  of the firm’, Review of 
Austrian Economics 12: 43-64. 
 
Dupuy J-P. 1992. Le sacrifice et l’envie (Sacrifice and Envy). Paris : Calmann-Lévy. 
 
Festré A. and Garrouste P. 2006. ‘Rationality, behaviour and institutional change in 
Schumpeter’,  Contribution to t he ESHET-JSHET meeting, Sophia Antipolis, 18-22 
December 2006.  
 
Endres A.M. 1991. ‘ Austrian capital and interest theory: Wieser’s contribution and the 
Menger tradition’, The Review of Austrian Economics 5(1): 67-90. 
 
Festré A. and Garrouste P. 2006. ‘Rationality, behaviour and institutional change in 
Schumpeter’, Contribution to the ESHET-JSHET meeting, Sophia Antipolis, 18-22 
December 2006.  
 
Fleetwood S. 1997. ‘Hayek III:  The Necessity of Social Rules of Conduct’. In Stephen 
Frowen (ed),  Hayek: the Economist and Social Philosopher - A Critical Retrospect.   
London: Macmillan.  
 
Garrouste P. 1994.  ‘Carl Menger and Friedrich Hayek on institutions: continuity and 
discontinuities’, Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 16(2): 270-91. 
   28 
Garrouste P. 1999. ‘Is the Hayekian Evolutionism coherent?’, History of Economic Ideas 7(1-
2): 85-103. 
 
Garrouste P. 2003. ‘Learning in economics: Austrian insights’. In S. Rizzello (ed.), Cognitive 
Developments in Economics. London: Routledge. 
 
Gilbert M. 1989. On Social Facts. London: Routledge. 
 
Hayek  F.A. 1952.  The Sensory Order:  An inquiry into the foundations of theoretical 
psychology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hayek F.A. 1978. New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and the History of Ideas. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Lachmann L. 1977. Capital, expectations, and the market process: Essays on the theory of the 
market economy. Edited with an introduction by Walter E. Gringer. Kansas City: Sheed 
Andrews and McMeel. 
 
Machlup F. 1980. Knowledge: Its creation, distribution, and economic significance (vol. 1, 
Knowledge and knowledge production). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
 Machlup F. 1982. Knowledge, its creation, distribution, and economic significance (vol. 2, 
The branches of learning). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Machlup F. 1984. Knowledge, its creation, distribution, and economic significance (vol. 3, 
The economics of information and human capital). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Menger C.  1871.  Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre.  English translation:  Principles of 
Economics. New York and London: New York  University Press (1976). 
 
Menger C. 1883. Untersuchung über die Methode der Sozialwissenschaft und der Politischen 
Oekonomie insbesondere.  English translation:  Problems of Economics and  Sociology. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press (1963).  
 
Menger C. 1892. ‘On the origin of money’, Economic Journal, November, 2. 
 
Mises von L. 1949. Human Action: a Treatise of Economics. Fourth revised version. San 
Francisco: Fox & Wilker (1996).  
 
Morgenstern O. 1927. ‘Friedrich von Wieser, 1851-1925’, American Economic Review 17(4): 
669-674. 
 
Nonaka, I. et Takeuchi, H. 1995. ‘The knowledge-creating company : how Japanese 
companies create the dynamics of innovation’. New York: Oxford University Press,  
 
O’Driscoll G.P.and Rizzo M. 1984. Time and ignorance in economics. New York: Basil 
Blackwell. 
   29 
Orléan A. 1998. ‘The evolution of imitation’. In P. Cohendet, P. Lleran, H. Stahn and G. 
Umbhauer (eds.), The economics of networks. Berlin and New York: Springer Verlag, pp. 
325-39. 
 
Polanyi M. 1967. The tacit dimension. New York: Anchor Books. 
 
Richardson G. 1990. Information and investment. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2
nd edition. 
 
Stigler G.J. 1941. Production and distribution theories. New York: Macmillan. 
 
Streissler E. 1987. ‘WIeser F. von’. In J. Eatwell M. Milate and P. Newman (eds.), The New 
Palgrave: A dictionary of Economics  (vol. 4). London: Macmillan. 
 
Streissler E. 1988. ‘The intellectual and political impact  of the Austrian School of 
Economics’, History of European Idea 9(2): 191-204. 
 
Swedberg R. 1991. Schumpeter J. A.: The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Wieser von. F. 1889. Der Natürliche Wert.   English translation: Natural Value. London: 
Macmillan & Company (1893). Reprinted in ‘Reprints of Economic Classics’, New York: 
Augustus M. Kelley Publishers (1971).  
 
Wieser von F. 1914. Theorie der Gesellschaftlichen Wirtschaft. English translation:  Social 
Economics. New York: Adelphi Co (1927). Reprinted in ‘Reprints of Economic Classics’, 
New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers (1967).  
 
Wieser von F. 1926. Das Gesetz der Macht. Vienna: Julius Springer. English Translation: The 
Law of Power. Bureau of Business Research, University of Nebraska-Lincoln (1983). 
 